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This study is part of a series of policy 
briefs on Europe and its neighbours 
in the east and south. In this series 
we publish papers commissioned or 
produced by the Bertelsmann Stif-
tung in cooperation with regional 
partners in the framework of our 
work in this field.
Setting the scene: de facto com-
peting, de jure conflicting region-
al projects?1 
The EU’s approach towards the 
eastern neighbourhood has evolved 
to become an inclusive EU-centred 
regional policy
With the articulation of its ‘proximity 
policy’ in 2002, the EU registered its 
explicit interest towards the eastern 
region, but had no particular strate-
gy or vision to support its intentions.2 
The initial policy resembled more 
of a generalist security-predicated 
aid package, primarily intending 
to safeguard EU borders (Youngs 
2009). Its subsequent reformulation 
into a European Neighbourhood 
1 This paper is originally a report submitted un-
der the Call for Evidence by the British House 
of Lords on the EU-Russia relations. We thank 
the author for making it available to us for pub-
lication within this policy brief series. Full report 
of the House of Lords is available here: http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/
ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf
2 Hence, the initial inclusion of Russia (sub-
sequently rejected by the latter), and almost 
incidental of the Southern Caucasus. For more 
discussion see Korosteleva 2012; Delcour 
2011. 
Policy (ENP) rendered it a ‘wider-
European’ focus with an overarch-
ing responsibility over the region un-
derpinned by an ‘enlargement-light’ 
strategy (Commission 2004). How-
ever, with the launch of the Eastern 
Partnership Initiative (EaP) in 2009, 
the policy gradually acquired a more 
pronounced (and contested) region-
building narrative (Commission 
2009). At its core was the promotion 
of low-key technocratic strategies of 
engagement to codify an EU-centred 
agenda into a series of roadmaps 
and Associations’ requirements, with 
some profound implications for the 
wider region.3    
The policy’s ‘regional’ framing was 
predicated on two fundamental 
principles of EU effective multilat-
eral regionalism - externalisation of 
EU governance and the promotion 
of ‘European cohesiveness’, thus 
naturally prioritising the EU legal 
and economic acquis to ‘first and 
foremost… ensure that the bene-
fits of the single European market 
based on free movements of goods 
and services, labour and capital, 
were as widely spread as possi-
ble’ (Ibid). As far as the European 
neighbourhood was concerned, as 
the Commission further argued, ‘the 
EU [specifically] wished to promote 
key concepts of EU regional policy 
3 EU region-building policies de facto assume 
the primacy of economic inter-regional coope-
ration, without a prospect of EU membership for 
the willing partners. 
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such as open markets, respect for 
environment, participative democ-
racy and partnership in the con-
ception and implementation of its 
development policy’ (Commission 
2014; emphasis added). 
Having encountered much criti-
cism from its own institutions and 
the region itself, by 2012 the ENP/
EaP became reduced to ‘a set of 
instruments’4 to further promote 
the eastern region’s internalisation 
of EU norms and regulations, sup-
ported by a complex machinery of 
financial tools and inclusive of all 
levels of society. The instruments 
in particular evolved to reflect the 
EU’s manifold aspects of economic 
and legal acquis, as transcribed in 
individualised roadmaps (Commis-
sion 2012) and more recently, the 
EU Association Agreements, now 
signed with Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia. The anticipated impact 
of these agreements, as claimed, 
was to develop ‘capacity of the 
third countries to set strategies 
and prioritise convergence of their 
regional policies with those of the 
EU’ (European Commission 2014:7, 
emphasis added). The overall aim, 
as initially conceived, was to bolster 
the formation of a Neighbourhood 
Economic Community (Casier et 
al 2014), as part of the EU-centred 
inter-regionalist strategies.  
4 From the author’s interviews with Commissi-
on officials in 2012
As a region-building project, the 
policy by definition entails inclu-
sion and exclusion (Delcour 2011), 
favouring conformity and isolating 
resistance, which also extends to 
Russia, which had originally re-
fused to be part of the EU’s ENP, 
and presently has set to pursue a 
region-building strategy of its own. 
From the start Russia has intended 
hegemonic region-building policies 
towards the eastern neighbourhood, 
while carefully observing EU ac-
tions in the region. 
Following the dissolution of the 
USSR, and the subsequent inter-
state integration tendencies, espe-
cially in economic and humanitarian 
fields, in 2007 Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, at the latter’s initiative, 
inaugurated the Eurasian Customs 
Union (ECU), an (alternative) Rus-
sian-led, region-building project 
in the post-Soviet space (Eura-
sian Economic Commission 2013). 
The construction of the ECU and 
the forthcoming Economic Union 
(EEU) allegedly emulates the EU’s 
supranational structures (Karlyuk 
2012) and has considerably moved 
apace from signing the initial treaty 
on the ECU Commission and Com-
mon Territory (2007), to establish-
ing the ECU in 2011 and the new 
Eurasian Economic Commission in 
2011, and a single economic space 
(SES) in 2012. The launch of the 
EEU is anticipated in 2015, with fur-
ther expansion of its membership 
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Dragneva and Wolczuk contend, 
‘unlike previous integration regimes, 
the ECU and SES provision have 
developed alongside Russia’s ac-
cession to the WTO in 2012,… in fu-
ture agreements to comply with the 
WTO regime, even in the case of 
non-WTO members, and for WTO 
law to prevail over any conflicting 
ECU provision’ (2014).  
Russia’s special interests in fos-
tering closer cooperation with its 
‘near abroad’ have been de jure 
stipulated in its foreign policy strat-
egies of 1993 and 1998, and rein-
forced further by pre-existing and 
increasing cooperation across the 
region. Hence, the AAs’ signature 
by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, 
presuming closer political, eco-
nomic and legal integration with the 
EU, has led to adverse reaction by 
Russia, resulting in politicisation of 
two competing but not yet conflic- 
ting or incompatible region-building 
projects in the neighbourhood.
De facto regional competition: 
‘shared’, ‘common’ or ‘no-man’s land’ 
neighbourhood?
The EaP and ECU region-building 
projects, by their design and ob-
jectives, do not seem dissimilar in 
their rhetorical projections by both 
the EU and Russia. At the same 
time the process of their realisa-
tion points to an enduring practice 
of tacit competition between the 
projects and recently articulated 
to prospectively include Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and 
Iran. Noting this fast-flowing re-
gional integration, Vladimir Putin 
commented: 
‘It took Europe 40 years to move 
from the European Coal and Steel 
Community to the full European 
Union. The establishment of the 
Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space is proceeding at 
a much faster pace because we 
could draw on the experience of 
the EU and other regional associa-
tions. We see their strengths and 
weaknesses. And this is our obvi-
ous advantage since it means we 
are in a position to avoid mistakes 
and unnecessary bureaucratic 
superstructures.’5  
The key features of this alterna-
tive regional integration project in-
clude market harmonisation,6 and 
interest-driven multilateral partner-
ships often led by Russia, with the 
consent of other signatories. Since 
its launch this regional project has 
not received adequate international 
recognition. At the same time, as 
5 http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-
prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-
project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3- 
6 This is different to the EU’s unilateral conver-
gence requirements for DCFTAs, but similar 
to the EU’s modus operandi with Switzerland, 
Canada, Norway etc. based on the conformity 
assessment principles. See http://ec.europa.
eu/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/
customs_security/aeo/mutual_recognition_ag-
reement/index_en.htm
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media adversely affecting percep-
tions as well as prospects for future 
cooperation across the region.
Second, both the EU and Rus-
sia claim to have an overlapping 
‘grand vision’ for the region, espe-
cially in terms of their prospective 
inter-regional economic coopera-
tion. The Commission, for example, 
contends: ‘Our vision is that these 
agreements should contribute in the 
long term to the eventual creation 
of a common economic space from 
Lisbon to Vladivostok, based on the 
WTO rules’ (Fule, 2013). In a similar 
manner, at the inception of the pro-
ject Vladimir Putin, the then Prime 
Minister, insisted that ‘we suggest 
a powerful supranational associa-
tion capable of becoming one of the 
poles in the modern world and serv-
ing as an efficient bridge between 
Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pa-
cific region…. Alongside other key 
players and regional structures, 
such as the European Union, the 
United States, China and APEC, 
the Eurasian Union will help ensure 
global sustainable development’ 
(2011).8 This overlapping ‘grand 
rhetoric’ of the EU and Russia, 
however, falls short when it comes 
to its implementation, resembling 
more a tug-of-war than partnership 
for regional modernisation. While 
the EU demands convergence with 
8 http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-
prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-
project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-
incompatibility of their respective 
economic components. This sense 
of rivalry between the two regional 
powers in the neighbourhood has 
been registered by public opinion7 
as ‘alarming’ and unconducive 
to the future sustainability of the 
region, and which, as the latest 
events in Ukraine illustrate, leads to 
the long-term instability and conflict 
in the neighbourhood, as well as 
the disruption of global order.
What are the seeming commonali-
ties and differences between the 
projects, and could they co-exist?
First, both projects effectively tar-
get an overlapping zone of interest – 
the eastern neighbourhood – which, 
however, is framed in somewhat 
conflicting terms by the EU and 
Russia. In particular, the former re-
fers to the region as ‘shared neigh-
bourhood’, de facto extending the 
EU governance bias towards the re-
gion. Conversely, Russia, from the 
early 2000s, has been methodically 
depicting the region as ‘common’ 
rather than ‘shared’, with subtle but 
crucial difference which invokes an 
alternative meaning – of a no-man’s 
land – for the same region (Shishki-
na 2013). More importantly, these 
terms of reference have been sig-
nificantly politicised in the Russian 
7 Opinion polls were conducted by the author in 
Belarus in 2013 and Moldova in 2014; findings 
have been corroborated by other survey sour-
ces. For more information visit http://www.kent.
ac.uk/politics/gec/research/index.html  
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not aim to defuse regional tensions 
caused by the alleged ‘incompat-
ibility’ of the two economic projects, 
but rather ‘to generate stability and 
predictability for both Russian and 
EU companies’ (Füle 2013). The 
decision to finally triangulate the 
EU and Russia’s intensions with 
Ukraine came rather late in 2014, 
as a consequence of war and the 
negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine 
whereby the DCFTA implementa-
tion by the latter was agreed to be 
delayed by six months, on Russia’s 
demands (Council 2014). Further-
more the Commission has also pro-
posed to establish official contacts 
with the Eurasian Union to start ne-
gotiations on harmonisation of re-
spective FTAs between the EU and 
the ECU.9 At the same time, while 
allowing Ukraine to stabilise in the 
interim period, the new rhetoric 
of postponement and prospective 
FTA discussions, cannot by itself 
reconcile more pressing issues of 
competition and incompatibility in 
the region, and requires urgent pro-
spective thinking. 
The battle of discourses:  
from competition to conflict
This section offers an illustration of 
how inflammable the unresolved dis-
courses of competing and allegedly 
9 http://www.focus-fen.net/
news/2014/09/13/348455/unian-it-is-time-for-
eu-to-establish-official-contacts-with-eurasian-
union-says-fule.html
its acquis, which is claimed to be 
incompatible with the ECU stand-
ards; Russia conversely, although 
envisaging a prospective applica-
tion of the WTO rules to the ECU/
EEU, operates more through com-
pulsion and dependency arguments 
bearing the mark of the Soviet times. 
Finally, both the EU and Russia 
clearly recognise each other’s pres-
ence and interests in the region, 
often stipulated in their respective 
official discourses. At the same 
time, in this acknowledgement of 
interests, they fail to understand, let 
alone to facilitate the need for in-
terface and trialogue over and with 
the region. Instead, they continue 
their advancement of overlapping 
but disjoined projects in the region, 
which in 2013, owing to their highly 
politicised focus on economic inte-
gration, led to the eruption of conflict 
in Ukraine. While recognising the 
region’s historical complexity, the 
EU efforts in particular fall short of 
discernment and resemble more of 
an ‘ostrich’ approach in a blinkered 
pursuit of its technocratic govern-
ance. Even in 2013, in the midst of 
the emerging tensions in the wider 
region, the EU approach remained 
unaltered: while negotiating the di-
visive AA/DCFTA with Ukraine, the 
EU also had separate talks with 
Russia on a ‘new’ PCA agreement, 
to belatedly consider ‘provisions for 
greater convergence of the regu-
latory framework between the EU 
and Russia’, which however did 
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The EU’s politicisation campaign 
intensified in the autumn 2013 re-
sponding to Russia’s growing pres-
sure on the neighbourhood. Two re-
gional projects were declared fully 
dichotomous and the expression 
of ‘choice’ and ‘allegiances’ was 
required from partner countries.  
The consequences have been debil-
itating for the region and the status-
quo of global order. While Ukraine 
refused to sign a deal with the EU 
at the Vilnius summit, it lost control 
over its own population, resulting 
in the Euromaidan protests and 
the ousting of President Yanuko-
vich. From that moment, EU-Russia 
relations became fully securitised, 
following Russia’s invasion and an-
nexation of Crimea, and its contin-
ued threat of intervention into east-
ern Ukraine. Securitisation also left 
the EU and the international system 
incapacitated. While drafting NATO 
troops to Ukraine’s western borders, 
with Russian troops stationed on 
high alert on Ukraine’s eastern bor-
der, the global actors lost control 
over a common strategy vis-à-vis 
Russia. Several months after Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea, highly 
securitised discourse between the 
EU and Russia continues to domi-
nate the EaP landscape, while the 
region desperately awaits its diffu-
sion and reconciliation. 
In light of the above developments, 
one would question the grand vi-
sion of the EU and Russia vis-à-vis 
incompatible regional projects are; 
and how easily they can shift from 
their politicisation to the level of se-
curitisation and war. The reverse 
process, that the region presently re-
quires, is far more difficult to ensure. 
Interpretation of the 2013 –14  
tensions in the eastern region: 
Rhetorical pronouncements of ma-
jor players could de facto form real 
action, which may disrupt or rein-
force stability. Consequently, and 
precisely through utterance, by 
declaring essential aspects of their 
respective regional projects (trade 
agreements – DCFTA and ECU 
codes) incompatible, the relations 
between the EU and Russia imme-
diately became politicised. This was 
initiated with the EU’s moderate but 
miscalculated campaign to acceler-
ate or arguably compel Ukraine to 
a decision over the AA at the then 
forthcoming EaP summit in the au-
tumn 2013: ‘It is crucial to define a 
vision for the coexistence and mu-
tual enrichment of the regional pro-
jects as not to end up with two dif-
ferent sets of rules in the European 
Union economic space and in the 
Customs Union’ (Füle 2013). Rus-
sia’s authorities followed suit imme-
diately by impressing the alternative 
choice on Presidents Yanukovich of 
Ukraine and Sargsyan of Armenia.10 
10 For more information see http://www.russian-
mission.eu/en/news-and-events
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peoples in the region: in 2013/14 
a healthy plurality (40 per cent on 
average) of the polled respondents 
across Belarus and Moldova indi-
cated attractiveness of both region-
al projects. Furthermore, a tem-
poral cross-regional comparison12 
reveals that both powers appeal to 
the residents of the region, in their 
own, complementary way: while 
the EEU is seen as important for 
energy security and trade; the EaP 
and the EU have stronger clout in 
promoting functional government 
and effective sector-specific coop-
eration. Enforcing a dichotomous 
choice on the region, not yet ready 
for making these commitments 
through their internalised norms of 
behaviour, testifies to the profound 
lack of understanding the ‘Other’ – 
the partner countries – including 
their needs and aspirations. The 
error of judgement by the EU and 
the loss of control by Russia are, in 
an equal measure, the causalities 
of the decision-making process 
which occurred in the vacuum of 
correlated knowledge, resulting 
in unnecessary politicisation and 
subsequent securitisation of the 
contestable narratives, as the case 
of Ukraine has lately demonstrated. 
The bigger question here, however, 
is whether and how the EU and 
12 Please refer to the results of 2008/9 ESRC 
project (RES-061-25-0001) available at http://
www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/research/research-
projects/europeanising-securitising-outsiders/
their respective regional projects in 
the neighbourhood. Two particular 
manifestations become apparent. 
First, in their self-centred projec-
tions, both the EU and Russia 
have explicitly disregarded each 
other’s rationalities over the con-
tested region. In particular, the EU 
focused on the default assumption 
that the exposure of Ukraine and 
others to the future benefits of the 
EU, and the promise of a ‘well-go-
verned ring of friends’ (centred on 
the EU) would enable recipients 
to unequivocally legitimise the Eu-
ropean course. This was clearly 
an error of judgement, not only in 
terms of the timing to harvest alle-
giances, but also, more essentially, 
in failing to factor Russia into the 
EU’s expansionist normative mo-
dus operandi. 
Second, and most significantly, 
both powers evidently failed to 
understand the region itself and 
its historical urge for complemen-
tary rather than dichotomous re-
lations with the wider Europe. As 
the following research findings11 
indicate both powers yield similar-
ly appealing offers in the eastern 
neighbourhood, which, instead of 
mobilising binary loyalties, foster 
an ambivalence of choice for the 
11 For more details  see the 2013-14 research 
results available at: http://www.kent.ac.uk/poli-
tics/gec/research/index.html
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Towards ‘depoliticisation’ of dis-
courses in EU-Russia relations 
over the neighbourhood
In light of the above discussion, the 
following conclusion becomes ap-
parent. The framing of political nar-
ratives (including ‘planting the flag’ 
over the region) is a sensitive mat-
ter, which requires sound analytical 
grounding and further contextuali-
sation. Transmission of narratives, 
as has been illustrated on Ukraine, 
could be either disruptive or peace-
making, paving the way either to-
wards ‘frozen’ conflicts or converse-
ly, to prospective normalisation and 
cooperation. It remains to be seen 
how the new negotiations over re-
spective regional FTAs will proceed 
in defusing tensions between the 
EU and Russia over and across the 
region. At least, what could be en-
sured for now, as the new Commis-
sion being installed,13 is the needed 
focus on framing new discourses 
and a search for new forums to fos-
ter mutual cooperation, where the 
compatibility of both economic pro-
jects would be firmly on the agenda.
Three recommendations may be 
particularly note-worthy to define 
the future course of action:
First, a study of the EU modus oper-
andi in the areas of mutual recogni-
tion and market harmonisation and 
13 From the author’s informal discussions with 
new members of Commissioner Hahn’s cabinet
Russia’s discourses could be de-
fused and de-securitised in their 
rhetorical furnishings, to return to 
a zone of peaceful coexistence. As 
our comparative research findings 
indicate, the normative framing of 
discourses continues to conflict in 
a profound way but they are not 
necessarily insurmountable. Both 
powers profess and are associ-
ated with differing sets of values 
which in turn support and engineer 
different behavioural patterns and 
expectations. Notably, the EU is 
clearly identified as a liberal demo-
cratic model, premised on the va- 
lues of democracy, human rights, 
market economic, and the lack of 
corruption; and the spatial analy-
sis of 2009 and 2014 public as-
sociations indicated a relative en-
durance of this model in people’s 
mind-sets’. At the same time, the 
ECU and Russia, in the respond-
ents’ eyes, offer a mix of qualities, 
a hybrid case, which could be re-
ferred to as a social democratic 
model, but which could potentially 
approximate the EU especially 
along the values of market eco- 
nomy, stability, economic prosper-
ity, and security, and at the same 
time retain its cultural uniqueness. 
The 2014 findings indicate there 
is more proximity in these values 
than was publicly purported in the 
earlier days of the EaP, five years 
ago, which could avail some pros-
pects for economic cooperation as 
optimal space if mutually agreed 
rules were to be considered. 
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Finally, a more discerning approach 
to the EaP partner countries is re-
quired from the EU, to understand 
their needs and prospective difficul-
ties, and to send the right signal to 
the eastern neighbourhood, which 
seeks complementarity rather com-
petition between respective region-
al projects. Rather than competition, 
there has to be cooperation be-
tween these projects, if the ‘grand 
vision’ of the greater neighbours – 
for a pan-European single market, 
premised on the WTO rules – were 
to be achieved.
Elena Korosteleva is currently 
Jean Monnet Chair in European 
Politics and Professor of Inter-
national Politics in the School of 
Politics and International Rela-
tions at the  University of Kent. 
She is a co-founder and Direc-
tor (Professional Studies) of the 
Global Europe Centre at Kent. 
 
its possible extension to the Eura-
sian Economic Union, in recognition 
of its regional presence, would be 
timely and advisable. The EU has 
developed an extensive experience 
of operating Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) across its own 
territory and with third countries, 
which aim to benefit businesses 
by providing easier access to con-
formity assessment regulated by in-
dependent and mutually appointed 
bodies (CABs).14 Discussing the po-
tential MRAs applications with the 
EaP and EEU members would as-
sure reciprocation and recognition 
of regional geopolitical sensitivity 
for individual parties. Furthermore 
the EU should also draw lessons 
from its ongoing negotiations with 
Kazakhstan, an ECU member, on 
developing a new PCA.15
Second, a study which does not 
only explain the benefits of the 
DCFTAs but also those of the EEU 
membership, and more importantly, 
that explores the pathways towards 
developing more synergies and 
prospective cooperation between 
the respective unions, would enable 
third parties to rationalise their own 
choice and articulate commitment 
to the project(s) as necessary. 
14 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-
market-goods/free-movement-non-harmonised-
sectors/mutual-recognition/index_en.htm#h2-1
15 http://www.astanatimes.com/2014/09/
kazakhstan-eu-close-completing-talks-new-
partnership-cooperation-agreement/
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